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Abstract 
No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in 
controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, 
India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. 
This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol, where the 
aforementioned countries either have no binding emission targets or have 
decided not to comply with their targets. Therefore, when discussing  possible 
post-Kyoto scenarios, it is crucial to prioritise participation incentives for all 
countries, especially those without explicit or with insufficient abatement 
targets. This paper offers a bottom-up game-theoretic perspective on 
participation incentives. Rather than focusing on issue linkage, transfers or 
burden sharing as tools to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate 
agreement, this paper aims at exploring whether a different policy approach 
could lead more countries to adopt effective climate control policies. This 
policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the 
freedom to sign agreements and deals, bilaterally or multilaterally, with other 
countries, without being constrained by any global protocol or convention. This 
study provides a game-theoretic assessment of this policy approach and then 
evaluates empirically the possible endogenous emergence of single or multiple 
climate coalitions. Welfare and technological consequences of different 
multiple bloc climate regimes will be assessed and their overall environmental 
effectiveness will be discussed. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Climate negotiations are a complex dynamic process. Climate change 
control, being a global public good, can hardly be attained on a voluntary 
basis. At the same time, there is no supranational authority  that can impose 
an effective international climate policy. Therefore, an international 
cooperative and voluntary agreement to curb global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions seems to be the only way to combat climate change. However, 
because of free-riding incentives and strong economic and environmental 
asymmetries, it is unlikely that an international climate agreement  will be 
signed by a large number of countries (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; 
Botteon and Carraro, 1997), unless its goals are not significantly different 
from those of a non-cooperative, business-as-usual, domestic policy 
(Barrett, 1994). 
 
Nonetheless, the diplomacy of climate policy has made  considerable 
progress in the last ten years. International climate policy has  recently 
enjoyed its first note-worthy  success. The Kyoto Protocol has come into 
force on February 16, 2005 and countries world-wide have already started 
discussions  on a possible, better designed, post-2012 climate agreement. 
 
However, the US defection from the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of explicit 
abatement targets for the main developing countries – China and India 
above all – have largely reduced the environmental effectiveness of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which remains far from achieving the objective of 
stabilising GHG concentrations at about 500-550 ppmv. Therefore, several 
policy proposals have emerged that could be adopted after 2012 and that 
could enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement (Cf. Aldy  
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et al., 2003; Aldy, Barrett and Stavins, 2003; Bodansky, 2004; Baumert et 
al., 2002; CNRS/LEPII-EPE et al., 2003; OECD/IEA, 2002). Some of these 
proposals are based on targets and timetables, others on the adoption of 
global economic instruments, others on technological development and 
cooperation, and others are a mix of different approaches (Cf. Barrett, 2001; 
Nordhaus, 2001; Kopp et al., 1999; Pizer, 1999; McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 
1997).  
 
Among the many existing proposals, there is one that has both a theoretical 
and an empirical appeal. This proposal was launched several years ago by 
Carraro (1998, 1999) –  where a game-theory argument was the main driver 
–  and more recently by other authors (Cf. Egenhofer and Legge, 2001; 
Egenhofer, Hager and Legge, 2001; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Reinstein, 
2004) on the basis of less theoretical considerations. The basic idea is to 
adopt a bottom-up, country-driven approach to defining national 
commitments. Instead of a top-down, international negotiation of national 
emission targets, each country would determine its contribution to a 
cooperative effort to curb GHGs and choose the partners with whom it 
intends to cooperate. In a process analogous to trade negotiations, each 
country would put its offer of commitments on the negotiating table and 
invite proposals from other countries for similar commitments. 
 
This basic idea may lead to a quite fragmented climate regime and to the 
formation of climate blocs (regional coalitions for example) in  much the 
same way as is now emerging in trade negotiations. This should not be 
surprising. In substance, even though not in form, the Kyoto Protocol 
already reflects agreements among several different coalitions. It 
incorporates special provisions for several different groups of countries. The 
Non-Annex B countries have no commitments and can benefit from 
emission reduction investments through the CDM. The most vulnerable 
Non-Annex B countries can also receive financial assistance for adaptation 
from the levy imposed on the CDM (and possibly on the other mechanisms).  
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The European Union has the ability under Article 4 to redistribute the 
emissions reduction burden. Australia  ha obtained/negotiated a special 
provision on land use emissions in Article 3.7.
1 
 
In addition, the lesson that can be derived from trade negotiations 
consistently tells us that progress on trade liberalisation can be achieved 
mostly through regional agreements, at least in the coming years.
2 In 
international trade, the “resurgence” of regionalism has thus become a 
crucial subject, underscored  by the formation of competing customs unions 
and the debate about free trade areas. Substantial attention has been focused 
on the efficiency and implications of these regional or sub-global co-
operations (Cf. Baldwin, 1993; Casella, 1995; Bloch and Ferrer, 1999; Bond 
and Syropoulos, 1996; Krugman, 1991; Yi, 1996a, 1996b and 1998).  
 
In particular, several authors have pointed out  that Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) may seem to be contradictory, but they can often 
actually support the WTO’s multilateral trading system (Cf. Sampson and 
Woolcock, 2003). Regional agreements have allowed groups of countries to 
negotiate rules and commitments that go beyond what was previously 
possible multilaterally. In turn, some of these rules have paved the way for 
agreements within the WTO. Services, intellectual property, environmental 
standards, investment and competition policies are all issues that were raised 
in regional negotiations and later developed into agreements or topics of 
                                                      
1 As  has been stressed by Egenhofer and Legge (2001), “it is increasingly becoming clear, 
[that] the Kyoto Protocol is less a global agreement than a set of differing regional 
approaches”. 
2 The strong increase in the number of trade bloc agreements registered with the World 
Trade Organisation is discussed in Tjornhom (2000) and Boonekamp (2003). Some 250 
regional trade agreements (RTAs) have been notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 
2002, of which 130 were notified after January 1995. Over 170 RTAs are currently in force. 
An additional 70 are estimated to be operational although not yet notified. By the end of 
2005, if RTAs reportedly planned or already under negotiation are concluded, the total 
number of RTAs in force might well number up to 300. As of October 2003, all 146 WTO 
Members, with the exception of Mongolia, participate in or are actively negotiating 




discussion in the WTO.
3 For these reasons, on 6 February 1996, the WTO 
General Council created the Regional Trade Agreements Committee. Its 
purpose is to examine regional groups and to assess whether they are 
consistent with WTO rules. The committee is also examining how regional 
arrangements might affect the multilateral trading system, and what the 
relationship between regional and multilateral arrangements might be. 
 
Can something similar take place in climate negotiations? Can countries 
find more incentives to participate in regional or sub-global climate 
agreements than in a global agreement? Will regional or sub-global climate 
blocs increase the amount of abated GHG emissions? Will they help to 
achieve a better control of climate change? 
 
This paper answers the above questions from a game-theoretic perspective, 
by providing both theoretical and empirical arguments in favour of regional 
and sub-global climate blocs. The next section will focus on theoretical 
analyses. It will provide a survey of well-known arguments –  at least well-
known among game-theorists – that may also be helpful for climate policy 
analysts. Then, the subsequent section will provide an empirical assessment 
of the incentives to participate in several regional or sub-global climate 
blocs, and will compare their environmental effectiveness. A final session 
will summarise our results and discuss their policy implications. 
 
 
                                                      
3 The groupings that are important for the WTO are those that abolish or reduce barriers to 
trade within the group. The WTO agreements recognize that regional arrangements and 
closer economic integration can benefit countries. It also recognizes that under some 
circumstances regional trading arrangements could hurt the trade interests of other 
countries. Normally, setting up a customs union or free trade area would violate the WTO’s 
principle of equal treatment for all trading partners (“most-favoured-nation”). But GATT’s 
Article 24 allows regional trading arrangements to be set up as a special exception, 
provided certain strict criteria are met. In particular, the arrangements should help trade 
flow more freely among the countries in the group without barriers being raised on trade 
with the outside world. In other words, regional integration should complement the 





2.  Regional and sub-global climate blocs. Lessons from coalition 
theory. 
 
The existing theoretical literature on coalition formation provides some 
reliable indications on the main features of the final equilibrium outcome of 
climate negotiations. If, as is often argued in the economic literature on 
international environmental agreements, a global agreement is unlikely to 
be attained (Cf. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994; recent surveys 
can be found in Barrett, 1997, 2002; Carraro and Galeotti, 2002), on the 
other hand, several small agreements are shown to be the equilibrium 
outcome of a coalition formation game with positive externalities (Cf. 
Bloch, 1997; Yi, 1997; Carraro, 2004), i.e. of a game that – like the climate 
change game – is characterised by free-riding incentives. Let us briefly 
review these latter results. 
 
The strategic choice of players who decide whether or not to form a 
coalition with other players and, if they do, with which specific players to 
cooperate, has been the subject of recent research in game theory.
4 These 
studies are based on a non-cooperative approach where binding 
commitments are excluded. This approach is particularly suitable for 
analysing the likely outcomes of future negotiations on climate change 
control, because no supra-national authority exists that can force countries 
to adopt policy measures to reduce their GHG emissions. Let us therefore 
examine the indications that the non-cooperative theory of coalition 
formation provides for the analysis of climate negotiations.    
 
                                                      
4 Most papers have been presented at the annual workshops of the Coalition Theory 
Network (see www.feem.it/ctn). Some of them are published in Carraro (2003) and in 
Demange et al. (2005).  
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The study of coalition formation poses three basic questions (Bloch 1996): 
(i) which coalitions will be formed ? (ii) how will the coalitional worth be 
divided among members ? (iii) how does the presence of other coalitions 
affect the incentives to cooperate? The traditional cooperative game theory 
(Cf. Aumann and Drèze, 1974) focuses on the second question – the 
division of the payoff between coalition members. The first question has 
been assumed away in most cooperative game theory and the third one is 
simply ignored, since the coalitional function cannot take into account 
externalities among coalitions. 
 
These limitations have led to the emergence of a new strand of literature 
describing the formation of coalitions as a non-cooperative process. In the 
non-cooperative approach, a player’s decision to join a coalition is often 
modelled as a two stage game. In the first stage, a player independently 
decides whether or not to join, by anticipating the consequence of his/her 
decision on the economic variables under control. In the second stage, 
he/she sets the value of these variables, given the coalition structure formed 
in the first stage. Under the simplifying assumption that the second stage 
equilibrium is unique for any coalition structure, the first stage game can be 
reduced to a partition function, which assigns a value to each coalition in a 
coalition structure as a function of the entire coalition structure. This 
enables us to capture the important effects of externalities across coalitions. 
 
The theoretical literature on the non-cooperative coalition formation has 
shown that, even without any commitment to cooperation and even in the 
presence of positive spillovers (i.e. in the case in which the formation of a 
coalition by some players increases the payoff of the players outside the 
coalition, as for public good provision), countries may form a coalition. 
 
The equilibrium coalition structure depends on several key assumptions, i.e. 
the membership rule, the order of moves, the players’ conjectures, the slope 
of their reaction functions (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 2003). Nonetheless,  
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some conclusions seem to be robust with respect to these assumptions and 
the related equilibrium concepts. For example, if a treaty is signed by many 
countries (i.e. a large coalition is formed) the amount of public good 
provided by the coalition (e.g. the amount of GHG abatement) is very close 
to the non-cooperative business-as-usual one (Barrett, 2002). As far as the 
goal of this paper is concerned, the most important conclusion is as follows. 
If countries are free to decide not only whether or not to sign a treaty but 
also which treaty (i.e. which coalition to join), there is generally more than 
one coalition at the equilibrium. For example, in the case of trade 
negotiations, there may be several trade blocs. In the case of environmental 
negotiations, several regional or sub-global climate agreements. 
 
This conclusion can be found for example in Bloch (1995, 1996), Ray and 
Vohra (1997, 1999), Yi (1997, 2003) and Yi and Shin (1995). The models 
used in these studies analyse the formation of multiple coalitions by 
adopting different notions of stability. Bloch (1995, 1996) examines an 
infinite-horizon “coalition unanimity” game, in which a coalition forms if 
and only if all potential members agree to form the coalition. Ray and Vohra 
(1997) assume the “equilibrium binding agreement” rule, under which 
coalitions are allowed to break up into smaller sub-coalitions only. Yi and 
Shin (1995) investigate the “open membership” game, in which non-
members can join an existing coalition even without the consensus of the 
existing members. Different membership rules lead to different predictions 
about stable coalition structures (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 2003). For 
example, the ”open membership” rule is unlikely to support the grand 
coalition as an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium coalition structure is 
generally very fragmented. By contrast, the “coalition unanimity” rule and 
the “equilibrium binding agreements” rule support more concentrated 
coalition structures at the equilibrium, but quite often not the grand coalition 
(Cf. Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). 
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Despite these differences, at least two conclusions are common to all the 
aforementioned game-theory  contributions. First, if countries can freely 
decide whether or not to cooperate, they usually divide themselves into two 
groups: a group of countries cooperate, whereas others free-ride. Secondly, 
at the equilibrium, the group of cooperators is split into several subgroups of 
cooperating countries, namely several coalitions form. These coalitions play 
non cooperatively against each other and against the free-riders.  
 
The above results have been used by Carraro (1998, 1999) to argue that the 
Kyoto Protocol was unlikely to be signed by many countries and that the 
emergence of alternative climate blocs was highly likely. More recently, 
these same conclusions have been shown also by Bloch (2003), Finus and 
Rundshagen (2003), Yi (2003), Bretteville et al. (2004). All these papers use 
a game-theory approach. However, some indications that regional or sub-
global climate blocs could be the appropriate way to address the difficulties 
emerging in climate negotiations can also be found in political science 
literature (see for example, Egenhofer and Legge, 2001; Egenhofer, Hager 
and Legge, 2001; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Reinstein, 2004).  
 
Game theory is still unable to identify the characteristics of the coalitions 
which could form at the equilibrium, because in theoretical models countries 
are usually assumed to be symmetric. By contrast, in actual climate 
negotiations, economic and environmental asymmetries play a very 
important role in defining a country’s participation incentives. Therefore, 
game theory models cannot tell us whether coalitions are formed by similar 
or different countries, whether geographical proximity matters or whether 
economic factors are more relevant (e.g. whether climate coalitions will 
exploit abatement costs asymmetries). More specifically, game theory can 
hardly identify the climate blocs that are most likely to emerge out of future 
negotiations on climate change control. 
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To address these latter issues, an applied game-theoretic analysis – where 
countries’ asymmetric economic structures are explicitly modelled – is 
necessary, in order to appropriately identify the incentives that lead 
countries to an equilibrium, multi-coalition climate regime. This is what we 
aim  to do in the following section.  
 
 
3.  Regional and sub-global climate blocs. An applied game theory   
analysis. 
 
The analysis of the possible outcomes of the dynamic process that defines 
the incentives to participate in a climate agreement has been carried out by 
using a modified version of Nordhaus’ RICE model (Cf. Nordhaus and 
Yang, 1996) in which endogenous and induced technical change are 
modelled. In our version of the model, called FEEM-RICE (Cf. Buonanno 
et al., 2002), technical change performs a twofold role: on the one hand, via 
increasing returns to scale, it yields endogenous growth; on the other hand, 




In the model, six countries/regions (US, EU, Japan (JPN), former Soviet 
Union (FSU), China (CHN) and the rest of the world (ROW)) optimally set 
the intertemporal values of four strategic variables: investments, R&D 
expenditure, abatement effort and net demand for emission permits
6. The 
countries play a two-stage game, whereby each of them decides 
independently in a first stage whether or not to join a coalition, by 
anticipating the consequence of its decision on the economic variables under 
                                                      
5 The FEEM-RICE model has already been used in Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo and 
Galeotti (2001), Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002), Buchner, Carraro and Cersosimo 
(2002), Buchner, Carraro, Cersosimo and Marchiori (2002) and in Buchner and Carraro 
(2004a). A brief description is contained in Buonanno, Carraro and Galeotti (2002).  
6 Note that, in all climate regimes, abatement is a strategic value which is optimally set at 
its welfare maximising level.  
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control. In the second stage, each player sets the value of these variables, 
given the coalition structure formed in the first stage. When no coalition 
forms, each country/region maximises its own individual welfare, given the 
other countries’ strategy. Countries which belong to the same coalition 
maximise their joint welfare. Given the interdependency of countries’ 
decisions, the equilibrium value of the control variables is the solution for a 
dynamic open-loop Nash game. We apply thus an extension of the PANE - 
equilibrium concept introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2002). In 
addition, we adopt the “open membership” rule, implying that non-members 
can join an existing coalition even without the consensus of the existing 
members. 
 
In addition to the model structure, two assumptions qualify our results
7. 
First, all countries/regions which adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement are 
assumed to meet their Kyoto target from 2010 onward.
8 We therefore adopt 
the so-called “Kyoto forever” hypothesis (Manne and Richels, 1999). Our 
reference to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement is partly imprecise since, for the 
sake of brevity, we will  at times call the “Kyoto protocol” or “Kyoto/Bonn 
agreement” a “Kyoto forever” scenario. Second, cooperating countries are 
assumed to adopt cost-effective environmental policies. In particular, cost-
effective market mechanisms (e.g. emission trading) are chosen over 
“command-and-control” measures in order to guarantee an efficient 
implementation of the environmental targets adopted within the coalition. 
Please note that Annex B countries that belong to a coalition and engage in 
                                                      
7 Please note also that our analysis focuses only on CO2. There are other man-made 
greenhouse gases and the Kyoto Protocol takes some of them into account. Moreover, both 
the Bonn agreement and the subsequent Marrakech deal emphasise the role of sinks in 
meeting the Kyoto targets. As shown by several recent analyses (e.g. Manne and Richels, 
2001; Jensen and Thelle, 2001), the inclusion of the other greenhouse gases and of sinks 
would further reduce mitigation costs . 
8 The use of the “Kyoto forever” hypothesis may be seen as a strong assumption. However, 
the CO2 concentration levels implicit in this assumption (if FEEM-RICE is a good 
description of the world) coincide with those in the A1B scenario (IPCC, 2001) which can 
be considered the “median” scenario among those currently proposed. We thus use the 
“Kyoto-forever” hypothesis not because it represents a realistic scenario, but as a 
benchmark with respect to which policy alternatives can be compared.  
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emissions trading face thus their Kyoto targets, whereas China is assumed to 
agree to a 10% reduction of emissions with respect to the BAU scenario 
over the whole time horizon if it accepts to participate in a coalition (and in 
emissions trading). If various sub-global coalitions form, then they are 
assumed to behave independently, without a link between them (i.e., there is 
no trade between all regional blocs on a common market). 
 
Using the FEEM-RICE model, we will analyse the incentives to move away 
from the present situation where the EU, Japan and Russia are committed to 
complying with their Kyoto targets and where the other countries/regions 
are free to determine their climate policy unilaterally. Therefore, our 
benchmark case, or business-as-usual scenario, to which we compare 
different potential climate regimes, is the coalition formed by the Annex B-
US countries. A dynamic applied game-theoretic  approach is used to identify 
a country’s optimal strategic behaviour, which will belong to an open-loop 
Nash equilibrium.  
 
We will explore the economic and environmental implications of three 
possible two-bloc climate regimes. In the first climate regime, one coalition 
(bloc) is formed by the EU and Russia, the second one by Japan and China. 
In the second regime, the first bloc is formed by the EU and Japan, whereas 
the second one by the US and Russia. Finally, we will analyse the case in 
which the Annex B-US bloc is complemented by a parallel bloc formed by 
the US and China. We will focus on changes of the main economic 
variables (welfare, as measured by discounted future consumption levels, 
R&D expenditure, global CO2 emissions and abatement costs, for which an 
indicator is the equilibrium price in the permit market) with respect to the 
business as usual scenario.  
 
Our focus is on post-2012 scenarios. We assume that a global agreement is 
only one of the possible outcomes of climate negotiations. Countries are 
also free to form regional or sub-global agreements. Therefore, we consider  
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situations in which countries that now belong to the Kyoto coalition may 
decide, according to their own economic interests, to leave the Kyoto 
coalition and cooperate on GHG emission control with other 
countries/regions
9. The time horizon over which climate policy is optimised 
is 2010-2100. 
 
We should stress that the focus of this paper is on economic incentives faced 
by countries, and that we thus adopt a positive approach without examining 
the stability of all potential agreements. There are several other political, 
cultural, environmental factors that could influence a country’s decision to 
join a given climate coalition. These will not be addressed in this paper. 
However, the economic dimension of climate negotiations is a very 
important one (and has often been considered as the most important one in 
the US). Therefore, this paper can provide a relevant, albeit partial, 
contribution to the analysis of the future evolution of international climate 
policy. 
 
3.1  A two-bloc coalition structure: EU with Russia and Japan with 
China 
The first case that we will analyse, using the FEEM-RICE model and a 
game-theoretic assessment of the optimal climate strategies in various 
countries/regions, is the one in which two blocs emerge out of climate 
negotiations. Let us assume that the US continue to adopt their own 
unilateral climate policy. What will the other countries do after 2012? One 
possibility is the formation of two regional climate blocs. One in Europe, 
formed by the EU and Russia, the other one in the Far-East, formed by 
Japan and China.  
 
                                                      
9 Notice that the rest of the world (ROW) has been exempted from possible future climate 
commitments due to policy indications, which suggest that an inclusion of these countries is 
very unlikely in the next stage of climate negotiations.   
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Russia has a strong interest in intensifying its relations with Europe, not 
only in order to improve its economic performance, but also to strengthen its 
political role within an enlarged, unified Europe. Cooperation on climate 
policy could demonstrate that Russia is indeed willing and prepared to bear 
responsibility and would thus be an important step in the direction of 
Western Europe. The recent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the Putin 
administration confirms this political trend.  Therefore, a scenario is which 
the EU and the FSU closely cooperate on climate seems to be likely, 
whereas there is increasing emphasis in Japan in favour of regional 
economic cooperation in East Asia and above all with China. Therefore, as 
part of its efforts to foster cooperation with China, Japan could also propose 
a deal concerning GHG emission reduction.  
 
The cooperation between China and Japan seems to be plausible because it 
would quite plausibly enhance the role of their geographical area and thus 
give the two countries stronger political weight. In addition, this cooperation 
could enable Japan to reduce its high abatement costs, China to improve its 
environmental performance and at the same time to profit from selling 
permits in the bilateral emission trading market. Since China officially 
demonstrates its “strong expectations of advanced Japanese environmental 
protection technologies to combat its own environmental problems” (The 
Japan Times, Jan. 26
th, 2002), a “win-win case” could be established if 
China could improve its environmental protection with Japanese assistance, 
while Japan could reach its Kyoto emission reduction target at a lower cost 
by cooperating with China. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the main economic and environmental consequences of a 
regime based on two regional blocs: EU and FSU on the one hand, JPN and 
China on the other one. From Figure 1, it is clear that, with respect to the 
Annex B-US case, China and FSU are the two losers. China because it moves 
from free-riding to climate change cooperation, even though its abatement  
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target is close to what it would be in a business-as-usual scenario.
10 The 
welfare loss of the FSU is even stronger because Japan no longer buys 
permits from the FSU. Therefore, the permit price in the bilateral market 
with the EU becomes very low with respect to the price when the Annex B-
US coalition forms (-25.2%). As a consequence, the EU reduces its 
abatement costs through a lower permit price induced by the reduced 
demand compared to the benchmark case. 
 
Japan is the main winner in this scenario. Japan gains because it can buy 
cheaper permits from China, since the permit price falls in comparison to 
the “Kyoto forever” regime where the Annex B-US coalition forms (in 
particular, the permit price in this market is 86.1% lower than in the 
benchmark case).  
 













                                                      
10 We assume that China agrees to a 10% reduction of emissions with respect to the BAU 






















With respect to the Annex B-US case, China increases its strategic R&D 
investments in order to have more supply of permits at its disposal, since a 
higher supply of permits implies an increase in their benefits from selling 
the permits on the emission market. Instead, the FSU reduces R&D 
investments because the profitability of the bilateral permit market with the 
EU is much lower than the profitability of the permit market where Japan is 
also a buyer. Total emissions become smaller because of the increased 
abatement in China. 
 
Therefore, when compared to our benchmark case, this two-blocs climate 
regime is profitable both to the EU and to Japan, who could therefore 
implement some compensation schemes to offset the losses incurred by 
China and above all by the FSU. However, when compared with the 
coalition formed by Annex B-US + China, the two bloc regime does not yield 
a positive welfare change for any of the cooperating countries.
11 Therefore, 
on the basis of economic incentives, the two-bloc climate regime just 
analysed does not seem to be likely. However, this regime is more 
environmentally effective than both the Annex B-US + China regime and the 
“Kyoto forever” one. 
 
The above analysis has not yet taken into account the role of the US. Is the 
US going to remain “stand alone” and to implement a domestic climate 
policy, which is likely to only achieve their non- cooperative emission 
abatement levels? Or will the US counter propose bilateral or trilateral deals 
with some other countries/regions in order to reduce their abatement costs 
and increase their environmental effectiveness? 
 
At the moment, the US is outside the Kyoto framework and has announced 
its alternative Climate Change Initiative. Even though the most obvious 
immediate US reaction lies in a domestic abatement program, other US 
                                                      
11 The economic implications of the coalition formed by the Annex B-US countries and by 
China are analysed in Buchner and Carraro (2004b).   
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moves are likely, and these may induce the emergence of other types of 
coalitions. As soon as the US realises that a large amount of emission 
abatement must be undertaken, they will also realise that these emission 
reductions are too costly if undertaken through domestic measures only. 
Already now, US industrial groups fear they may not qualify for incentives 
that Kyoto countries use to promote emission reductions (The Washington 
Times, Jan. 24
th, 2002). Moreover, the US have significant economic and 
strategic as well as environmental interests in joining the international 
cooperative effort  to control climate change, since they cannot afford to 
remain on the sidelines while others design a global climate regime (Stewart 
and Wiener, 2003). 
 
As recently reported in the international press, a proposal aims at 
establishing a scheme based on a cap on emission levels and awards for 
permits under the NAFTA. This alternative would imply that the US, 
Canada and Mexico were participants in a cross-border trading scheme 
(Financial Times, Dec. 4
th and 13
th, 2001). The establishment of a regional 




Other signs of an active international US role are the “US-Australia Climate 
Action Partnership”, an initiative consisting of various programs aimed at 
improving  scientific cooperation in areas including climate change science, 
reduced emissions strategies and engagement with business on technology 
to reduce GHG emissions (News.com.au, July 2
nd, 2002, CO2e.com, July 
7
th, 2002). Or a similar partnership between the US and Japan, aimed at 
promoting joint projects and exchanging opinions on various measures to 
                                                      
12 Also in Canada, which is still partner in the Umbrella Group, industry is asking for 
clarification regarding the economic consequences of implementing the Kyoto Protocol 
without the US. The Canadian government recognises the difficulties that arise from the 
linked nature of American and Canadian economies, but is still supportive to the agreement 
(the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by Canada in December 2001).   
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prevent global warming (CO2e.com, April 5
th, 2002) and a comparable US-
India technology cooperation project.  
 
A further step in the US strategy could thus consist in offering a partnership 
to large emission permit suppliers, as e.g. the FSU or China. In order to 
improve its performance in the emission market, the US could offer the FSU 
or China better conditions than the ones offered by the EU and Japan. Let us 
therefore analyse these two scenarios. 
 
3.2  A second two-bloc coalition structure: US with Russia and EU with 
Japan  
What would be the consequences of a climate regime in which the US and 
the FSU cooperate
13 without the EU and Japan, while these two countries 
remain committed to their Kyoto obligations? 
 
As shown by Figure 2, this two-bloc climate regime is certainly 
environmentally effective – emissions decrease by 10% with respect to the 
benchmark – but it is not likely to emerge, because total welfare of all 
cooperating countries becomes lower. Only China improves its welfare, 
because more abatement is undertaken at the world level. However, China’s 
welfare in this two bloc regime is again lower than its welfare in the 
coalition formed by Annex B-US + China (Cf. Buchner and Carraro, 2004b).  
 
The reason for the reduced welfare in the EU and Japan is fairly evident. 
Their abatement costs largely increase because they can no longer exploit 
the lower abatement costs in the FSU (the permit price in the EU-Japan 
market increases by 220.6% with respect to the benchmark “Kyoto forever” 
case).  
                                                      
13 The United States and Russia said on January 17
th, 2003 that they would seek a common 
approach to battling global warming. The first meeting of the Russian-American 
intergovernmental workgroup looking into climatic changes took place in Moscow, in April 
2003 (Agence France-Presse, Jan. 17
th, 2003).  
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The reason for the reduced welfare in the US depends on our choice of the 
benchmark. We are comparing a situation in which the US cooperates with 
the FSU with a situation in which it free-rides (the Annex B-US coalition). 
Therefore, even though it can take advantage from the FSU’s “hot air”, its 
costs obviously increase because it increases its abatement effort with 
respect to the free-riding abatement effort. For the same reason,  US welfare 
is also lower if compared with its welfare when the coalition (Annex B-US + 
China) forms. 
 
Finally, the FSU’s welfare also decreases because marginal abatement costs 
in the US are lower than in Japan and the EU. Therefore, the permit price in 
the US-FSU market is lower (-25.2%) than in the EU-Japan-FSU market. As 
a consequence, the FSU reduces its revenue from selling permits. In 
addition, the incentive to undertake strategic R&D is lower than in the 
benchmark case. Hence, R&D in the FSU is lower, thus lowering the supply 
of permits. R&D is instead much higher in the US, which is  faced  a real 
incentive to abate emissions at low cost.  
 
Figure 2: A second climate regime with two blocs: 1) US and FSU; 2) 




























Emissions R&D USA R&D JPN R&D EU R&D CHN R&D FSU 
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Summing up, this climate regime is unlikely to emerge because of the lack 
of economic incentives, even though the cooperation within the two blocs is 
more environmentally effective than cooperation within the “Kyoto forever” 
coalition. 
 
Let us therefore explore a third scenario, where again a two bloc climate 
regime forms. This scenario originates from two basic facts: (i) it is unlikely 
that a US strategy could break the Annex B-US bloc, due both to political 
reasons and because of the lack of economic incentives just described; (ii) in 
the US, the involvement of developing countries in a cooperative climate 
regime is seen as crucial to achieving  long term goals.  Therefore, in order 
to reduce its abatement costs and increase its domestic political credibility, 
the US could negotiate an agreement with China, thus giving rise to an 
emissions trading market where the equilibrium permit price would be low. 
The climate regime would then be formed by the following two blocs: US 
and China on the one hand, and EU, Japan and FSU on the other. 
 
3.3  A third two-bloc coalition structure: US with China and EU with 
Russia and Japan  
There is some evidence that this regime may not be unrealistic. China’s 
decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the country is aware 
that benefits from ratification could be high because China is the largest 
permit seller. Chinese officials emphasise that the government will 
voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO2 emissions, but is strictly 





                                                      
14 However, in the longer term, China will have to cope with its role of second-largest CO2 
emitter in the world. The first signs that China is recognising these political reasons are 
clear. The ratification of the Kyoto protocol in its actual form could therefore be interpreted 
more as a long-term commitment to emission control than as a short run strategy to reap the 
benefits on the emission trading market.  
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Without binding commitments or with very mild abatement targets and 
given the consequent high amount of permits which can be supplied, China 
is a very attractive partner in climate change control activities. This is why 
the US could convince China to cooperate under a joint climate pact. In this 
way, the US could achieve two goals: (i) satisfy domestic political 
requirements by involving developing countries in their climate strategy; (ii) 
reap high benefits from a large joint emissions market (the US and China 
together account for more than one-third of the world-wide CO2 emissions 
and this share is becoming larger and larger). In particular, the US could 
drastically decrease their abatement costs through emission trading and 
China could profit from selling a large amount of permits.  
 
What would then be the main consequences of a two bloc climate regime 
with a first bloc formed by the EU, Japan and the FSU (the Kyoto coalition) 
and a second bloc formed by the US and China? Some of these 
consequences are shown in Figure 3. 
 
First of all, it is clear that both the US and CHN lose with respect to the case 
in which they free-ride. However, the loss for the US is small and could be 
largely compensated by some ancillary benefits from GHG emission 
abatement that are not taken into account in our model.  
 
The loss for China is also small – and even smaller when compared to the 
regime in which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms – and ancillary 
benefits, both on the environmental and economic side, could be large. Note 
that, as discussed in the next section, this climate regime is the one most 
preferred by both the US and China when they do not free-ride. Namely, it 
is the most preferred among those in which they undertake some 
cooperative emission abatement. 
 
The inclusion of China in a coalition with the US is slightly beneficial for 
the Kyoto climate bloc consisting of the European Union, Japan and the  
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FSU, because of the enhanced environmental effectiveness of this two-bloc 
regime. Indeed, GHG emissions are almost 20% lower than in the 
benchmark case, and also lower with respect to total emissions in the 
climate regime in which the coalition (Annex B-US + China) forms. 
However, the coalition (Annex B-US + China) is the most preferred by the 
EU and Japan, because the absence of China from the coalition increases 
marginal abatement costs and thus induces welfare losses for the EU and 
Japan. 
 
Figure 3: A third climate regime with two blocs: 1) US and CHN; 2) 













This two-bloc climate regime is characterised again by a large expansion of 
China’s R&D investments. China over-invests in R&D to increase its sales 
in the bilateral emission trading market. The segmentation of the trading 
market also explains why R&D investments within the benchmark Annex B-
US coalition do not change. However, if the comparison is made with the 
coalition (Annex B-US + China), then it can be seen that R&D investments in 
this climate regime are higher for all Annex B-US countries. The reason is 

























permit market. This induces higher investments in R&D in the EU and 
Japan and also strategic R&D investments in the FSU, which will find it 
optimal to increase its supply of permits. 
 
The next section will provide a synthesis of our results by comparing 
different regimes not only with respect to the benchmark climate coalition 
formed by the Annex B-US countries, but also by cross-comparing all 
different regimes in terms of domestic welfare and global emissions. This 
comparison will enable us both to assess the consistency of our results with 
the game-theory predictions described in Section 2 and to draw some policy 
conclusions. 
 
4.  Participation incentives in a bottom-up regime: some policy 
implications. 
In the previous sections, three two-bloc climate regimes have been 
identified as possible evolutions of the present situation in which the Annex 
B-US countries – EU, FSU and Japan – cooperate to reduce GHG emissions. 
Costs and benefits of a move from this benchmark regime to a new one have 
been discussed.  
 
This section attempts to draw some policy lessons from the above analyses. 
To achieve this goal, we need to complement the economic and political 
analysis of the previous sections with a comparison across all potential new 
climate regimes
15. In this section, for reasons of space, we focus this 
comparison on two dimensions: domestic welfare and global emissions. 
Namely, we plan to identify each country’s most preferred regime and to 
compare it with the socially optimal regime. In addition, the most 
                                                      
15 Given the policy indications, which suggest that an inclusion of the least-developed 
countries is very unlikely in the next stage of climate negotiations, we have decided to 
exempt the rest of the world (ROW) from potential short- to medium term emission 
reduction commitments.  
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environmentally effective climate regime will also be considered as a 
possible target that policy could achieve. 
 
Our results are summarised by Tables 1a, 1b and 2. Tables 1a, 1b show the 
ranking of climate coalition structures according to domestic welfare. Table 
2 shows the ranking of climate regimes according to global welfare and 
global emissions. These tables provide information that could enable us to 
identify the most likely behaviour of countries in future climate negotiations 
(at least to the extent that economic incentives affect climate negotiations).  
 
Let us first focus on the US. The two most preferred coalition structures are 
the ones in which the US is not involved in any climate coalition (see Table 
1a). Note that the US’s most preferred regime is the present Annex B-US 
coalition. However, the US’s most preferred regime when it participates in a 
climate coalition is the one in which the US cooperates (and trades) with 
China, whilst a second cooperative bloc is formed by the Annex B-US 
coalition, i.e. the US prefers the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, 
CHN)].  
 
The ranking of climate coalition structures for the two main industrialised 
countries involved in the “Kyoto forever” regimes indicates some 
similarities. Both the EU and Japan rank the present “Kyoto forever” 
coalition very low, thus suggesting that a post-2012 change is likely. And 
both rank cooperation with China quite high. Indeed, the coalition (JPN, 
EU, CHN, FSU) is the EU’s most preferred regime, while Japan ranks first 
the coalition structure consisting of two blocs, the Asian bloc (JPN and 
CHN) on the one hand and the European bloc (EU plus FSU) on the other. 
In both cases, the EU and Japan can profit from either a large emission 
permit market or at least the presence of an important permit supplier, which 
implies a low permit price and thus low abatement costs. The worst regime 
for the EU (and for Japan) is the one in which the EU and Japan form a 
coalition without having any large permit supplier at their disposal.   
  24
Table 1a. The ranking of climate regimes according to domestic total welfare: US, 
JPN and EU 
 
Note that the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)], i.e. the 
climate regime in which the US and China cooperate within one bloc, whilst 
EU, FSU and Japan cooperate within a second bloc, is ranked fifth both by 
the EU and by Japan. However, there are also some differences in the 
preferences of the EU and Japan. In particular, large coalitions are more 
preferred by the EU than by Japan.  
 
Let us analyse the preferences of the less developed countries, China and the 
FSU. China acts as a rational free-rider. Its preferred regime is the two-bloc 
regime in which the EU cooperates with Japan and the US with Russia, and 
its second-best option is a regime in which China free-rides. China’s most 
preferred regime when it participates in a climate coalition is the one in 
which China cooperates (and trades) with the US, whilst a second 
cooperative bloc is formed by the Annex B-US coalition. The possibility of 
an Asian bloc appears to restrict its potential advantage with respect to gains 
from the emission market.   
 
USA JPN  EU 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN,CHN) & (EU,  FSU) 
(EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, 
CHN) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, 
CHN) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, 
CHN) 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU)  
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Finally, the FSU is penalised by China’s participation in a climate regime 
for the reasons explained in the previous section. Therefore, the FSU would 
like to avoid coalitions in which China also participates. The FSU’s most 
preferred regime is the Annex B-US coalition, where China is not involved 
and Russia therefore represents the only permit seller. 
 
CHN FSU 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN) 
(EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)   (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 
(JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
Table 1b. The ranking of climate regimes according to domestic total welfare: 
CHN and FSU 
 
 
What are the policy lessons that can be derived from Tables 1a and 1b? As 
seen above, US and China have a strong incentive to free-ride, namely to set 
their environmental policy unilaterally, thus profiting from the abatement 
levels set for the Kyoto coalition countries. In particular, the Annex B-US 
coalition is the US’s most preferred regime and has been ranked third by 
China. The Annex B-US coalition is also good for the FSU, for which this is 
the second-best outcome when it decides not to free-ride.  
 
EU and Japan have a strong incentive to maintain cooperation with a large 
permit seller, e.g. at least with the FSU. Indeed, the worst coalition 
structures for the EU and for Japan are the ones in which the EU and Japan 
form a coalition without either China or the FSU.   
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In short, the climate coalition structure where only the EU, Japan and the 
FSU cooperate is fairly stable in terms of economic incentives, but highly 
ineffective from an environmental viewpoint, as is demonstrated by Table 2. 
Paradoxically, this regime is not welcome by the EU and Japan, but is 
among the most preferred ones by the other countries.  
 
What could be an alternative climate regime with adequate economic 
incentives for the participating countries/regions? It is clear the Russia does 
not like to cooperate with China, because of the losses that it would suffer in 
the permit market. China would like to free ride, but if it cooperates, it 
prefers the coalition structure  [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)]. Likewise 
for the US. The EU would prefer a large coalition, whereas Japan likes a 
regional two-bloc coalition (when it does not free ride). 
 
Therefore, if for some environmental, economic or political reasons, the US 
and China decide to cooperate to control their GHG emissions, they may 
sign a bilateral agreement rather than joining a large global coalition. This 
situation, which corresponds to the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), 
(USA, CHN)], slightly increases welfare in the EU, Japan and the FSU, at 
least with respect to the present Kyoto coalition (see Figure 3). Therefore, 
the Annex B-US countries may accept a two bloc regime, where the US and 
CHN cooperate on emission abatement and trade permits in a bilateral 
permit market. The economic loss for the US and CHN would be small with 
respect to the situation in which they free-ride, but the global environmental 
benefits would be large. Even though this is not the most preferred outcome 
for any country, it is the outcome which is likely to be the most attractive or 
at least the one which raises the smallest opposition. 
 
The above conclusion is based on a decentralised analysis of each country’s 
incentives to join a climate coalition. However, it would be important to 
assess what a central planner would do when his/her goal is the  
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maximisation of global welfare. The answer is provided by Table 2, which 
shows that global welfare – which includes welfare of free-riders – is 
maximised when the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU), USA] 
forms
16. Second is the coalition structure [(JPN, CHN), (EU, FSU), USA], 
whereas the climate regime where the US cooperates with China and the 
Annex B-US forms as a second bloc, i.e. [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)], is 
only sixth. Notice, that global welfare seems to be maximised when the US 
does not belong to a climate coalition, which suggests that an unconstrained 
growth of the US economy may be beneficial to the world economy, despite 
the damage to the environment.  
 
 
Global GHG Emissions  Global Welfare 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU) 
(EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 
Table 2. The ranking of climate regimes according to global welfare and 
global GHG emissions  
 
 
Table 2 also illustrates that the two-bloc climate regime [(JPN, EU, FSU), 
(USA, CHN)] would provide the second largest possible benefits for the 
                                                      
16 The fact that the grand coalition does not appear first in the ranking of global welfare is 
due to the exemption of ROW from the climate coalitions considered as possible in the near 
future.  
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environment, without inducing high economic costs in the cooperating 
countries.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
The conclusion emerging from the above analysis can be summarised as 
follows. A move from the current climate regime is not likely, at least in the 
short-run. The US – which presently does not participate in the Kyoto 
Protocol – is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join a coalition 
to control GHG emissions. However, it is unlikely that, at least in the 
medium term, the US continues to reject any form of cooperation on climate 
change control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime which is 
least opposed (in terms of net economic benefits) by the negotiating 
countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally and the 
Annex B-US countries form a parallel coalition. 
 
Of course, the above findings must be taken cautiously. First, because they 
are based only on the analysis of economic incentives, whereas political 
decisions could be taken on the basis of other types of incentives. Second, 
because we did not account for the link between climate negotiations and 
other international negotiation processes (e.g. on crime, trade, terrorism, 
technology, etc.). Third, because the FEEM-RICE model used in this study 
is a simplified representation of the world economic system, even though it 
captures the main economic mechanisms and the related incentive schemes.  
 
Nonetheless, the results derived from the empirical analysis proposed in this 
paper are quite consistent with suggestions and results proposed in game-
theory literature (where countries’ asymmetries are usually neglected). This 
suggests that the analysis in this paper is likely to capture the relevant 
economic incentives and may therefore serve to provide indications on the 
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